In Sidaway v the Board ofGovernors ofthe Bethlem Royal Hospital etc, the Court of Appeal, on 23 February 1984, considered for the first time the issue of 'informed consent' . As Sir John Donaldson MR explained, the issue in the appeal was not whether anything could have been done to avoid what happened to the plaintiff in the course of an operation for the relief of pain, but whether she should have been more fully informed of the risks before she agreed to have the operation. At the trial, Skinner J held that had the plaintiff been more fully informed, she would not have agreed to undergo the operation -but he also held that she was told as much as any patient would have been told by many responsible skilled and experienced neuro-surgeons, and that this, in law, was all she was entitled to expect and he dismissed her claim.
The Court of Appeal, dismissing the plaintiff's appeal, applied the law in relation to complaints of negligence in diagnosis and treatment, the topics with which the House of Lords decisions of Whitehouse v Jordan (1981) 1 WLR 246 and Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority (May 1983 unreported) were concerned, in which McNair J's direction to the jury in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957) 1 WLR 582 were applied. This test of law had been applied in Chatterton v Gerson (1981) 1 QB 432 and in Hills v Potter (1983) 3 All ER 716 to the question of disclosure of risks before treatment. Rejecting the Transatlantic approach, the Court of Appeal considered the following issues: Consent: Sir John Donaldson MR, who gave the leading judgment, said that he was wholly satisfied that as a matter of English law a consent is not vitiated by a failure on the part of a doctor to give the patient sufficient information before the consent is given. It is only if the consent is obtained by fraud or by misreprehension of the nature of what is to be done that it can be said that an apparent~onsent is not a true consent. See R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23, 43. The contrary was not argued during this appeal.
The Duty of Disclosure:
What information should be disclosed and how and when it should be disclosed is very much a matter for professional judgment, to be exercised in the context of the doctor's relationship with a particular patient in particular circumstances. Sir John Donaldson MR said for this reason 'I would reject the American formulation of the duty of reference to a "prudent patient" test. No doubt it is valid if the doctor happens to be treating that happy abstraction, the "prudent patient", but I suspect he is a fairly rare bird and I have no doubt that his removal to the courts from his natural habitat, which would, I assume, be a seat or hand rail on the Clapham omnibus, would do nothing for patients or medicine, although it might do a great deal for lawyers and ligitation.' It would be a mistake and not in accordance with the traditional way in which the common law is developed, to formulate different aspects of the duty of care with precision. It is the general duty that matters; precision comes when the general duty is applied to a particular situation.
Accordingly, Sir John Donaldson said that the general duty was to take such action by way of giving or withholding information as is reasonable in all the circumstances of which the doctor knows or ought to know, including the patient's true wishes, with a view to placing the patient in a position to make a rational choice whether or not to accept the doctor's recommendation. This duty of disclosure involved professional expertise. However, the courts would not stand idly by if the medical profession, by an excess of paternalism, denies its patients a real choice. In a word, the law will not permit the medical profession to play God.
Put another way, the 'duty of disclosure is fulfilled if the doctor acts in accordance with a practice rightly accepted as proper by a body of skilled and experienced medical men.'
Browne-Wilkinson and Dunn LJJ delivered individual but concurring judgments dismissing the plaintiff's appeal. The case is destined for the House of Lords.
The difficulty lies in applying the broad general principles of the duty to everyday practice. While some patients may not wish to know what may go wrong in terms of what parts of his body may be accidentally damaged, others, particularly those who have suffered from medical misadventure either personally or been involved at close range, may prefer to be 'fully informed'. Sometimes the technicalities obscure the practical possible consequences; processes may be described leaving the patient confused and little the wiser, but in my view, the average patient in 1984 wishes to be more informed than most doctors seem to believe, particularly where a condition can be endured uncomfortably, but when the consequences of a mishap during operation may be far graver than what was sought to be remedied. Though doctors do not wish to raise unnecessary anxieties in patients, this must not prevent them from disclosing material risks and encourage them to withhold information which the patient should have before he decides whether to proceed with the :reatment. This point was made by Browne-Wilkinson LJ, who, like the other members of the Court of Appeal, did not wish to create a climate of malpractice claims with the kind of problems seen in the USA. However, Browne-Wilkinson did emphasise that the doctor had a prima facie duty to disclose, and that a oatient had to decide for himself whether to have the operation, but that in the final analysis, the doctor's conduct will still continue to be judged in accordance with the standards of his profession.
It seems therefore, that it is up to the patient who wishes to be more fully mformed to ask more questions before consenting to an operation. Even though 'i risk may be statistically remote, it may be one which an individual may not oe prepared to take, even though the doctor may think that the patient should disregard it. One experienced surgeon said that he regarded medical treatment In the hands of the expert as being like flying with a trained pilot. One knew there were risks but one placed onself in his hands and did not ask what might o wrong! I would interpolate that there are still those who perhaps irrationally refuse to fly at all, and further, unlike the surgeon who performs the operation or the anaethetist who induces oblivion, the pilot takes his own life as well as .he passenger's in his hands!
DIANA BRAHAMS
April 1984 see Lancet Reprints)
MEDICO-LEGAL SOCIETY'S TIE AND SCARF
, tie is available to members. It is dark blue with a single motif of the Hippocratic serpent around a symbol of Justice. Price £2.50 inclusive of oostage.
\. scarf has recently been introduced for lady members and the wives of male members. This is a dark blue square with a motif in each corner similar to that m the tie. Price £3.50 inclusive of postage. oth are available from Professor David Bowen, Department of Forensic Medicine, Charing Cross Hospital Medical School, Fulham Palace Road, .ondon, W6.
